活動起日：2018-01-05 發佈日期：2017-12-28 瀏覽數：218 2017-12-28 更新
本系擬於 1/5 (五) 邀請台北大學的顏汝芳教授至本所進行專題演講，完整訊息如下：
時間: 1/5 (五) 10:30-12:00
地點: 管理學院一號館 405 教室
講題: Gambling in the Loan Market: Why Banks Prefer Overconfident CEOs
This paper investigates whether or not banks prefer overconfident borrowers. Our findings show that banks favor firms with overconfident CEOs, while hedging against the downside risk of loan payments, with the result that these borrowers enjoy lower loan rates, especially when they have rich firm-specific growth opportunities or during periods of prosperity. Evidence shows that firms with overconfident CEOs bring greater future business opportunities to banks, thereby luring them to relax their lending standards for these firms. Such behavior implies that banks may prefer to do business with high-risk borrowers if sufficient future benefit accrues to them from such activity.